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ABSTRACT
Checklist-based screening instruments have a role in the assessment of mentally disordered
and criminal offenders, but their value for screening for vulnerability to violent extremism
remains moot. This study examined the effectiveness of using the Identifying Vulnerable
People (IVP) guidance to identify serious violence in persons convicted or killed in the
process of committing a violent-extremist offence using open-source intelligence (i.e.,
publically available archival material). Of 182 specific participants identified, specific
offence data was available for 157 individuals. Blind kappas for individual items of the 16-
item IVP guidance ranged from 0.67 to 1.00. IVP guidance was more reliable when applied
to conventional terrorist groups, but missing information significantly reduced reliability.
Weighting items thought more central to violent extremism (death rhetoric, extremist group
membership, contact with recruiters, advanced paramilitary training, overseas combat) did
not improve reliability or prediction. Although the total unweighted IVP score predicted
some acts of violence, test effectiveness statistics suggested IVP guidance was most effective
as a negative predictor of grave outcomes, and best applicable to conventional ideological
violent extremists who came to this position through typical “terrorist” trajectories. Results
suggest the IVP guidance has potential value as an initial screening tool, but must be applied
appropriately to persons of interest, is strongly dependent on the integrity and completeness
of information, and does not supercede human-led risk assessment of the case and acute risk
states.
Keywords: VIOLENT EXTREMISM; TERRORISM; RISK ASSESSMENT; SCREENING TESTS;
VIOLENCE; IDEOLOGY; SCHOOL SHOOTERS; MASS MURDER.
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POSITIVECAN YOU IDENTIFY PEOPLE VULNERABLE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM USING A SIMPLE
CHECKLIST AND OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE ALONE?
INTRODUCTION
While the ideologies of violent extremism span a wide variety of religious, political, and
social views, such views tend to be expressed relatively consistently; they tend to be
uncompromising, certain, intolerant, and inclined to dehumanise the opposition. The most
extreme adherents of such views rationalise violence as a necessary part of their group’s
agenda (Wintrobe, 2006). Cognitive cues such as ideology, affiliation, grievance thinking,
self-righteous morality, and moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999) are all plausible constructs
to explain why some persons engage in politically-motivated violent extremism (Monahan,
2012). Others describe individuals having a “fused identity”, whereby an individual’s
identity becomes so synonymous with that of a collective or social self as to make them
willing to sacrifice themselves (sometimes literally) for their beliefs (Swann, Jetten, Gómez,
Whitehouse, & Bastian, 2012). Different ideologies and trajectories may radicalise
individuals differentially (Borum, 2011, 2014). However, before one can investigate the
psychology of violent extremism, persons who present such a threat need to identified. The
current study examines the effectiveness of one potential set of guidelines – the UK’s
Identifying Vulnerable People (IVP) guidance – using a sample of persons involved with or
convicted of violent extremism who have data available in the public domain.
Screening for vulnerability.
The UK Government’s counter-terrorism strategy policy comprises four goals; to
prevent, pursue, protect, and prepare (HM Government, 2006). Prevention interventions
generate a range of moral and ethical dilemmas for practitioners, which include the
identification and engagement of individuals who have not actually done anything illegal, on
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the premise that they might. Axiomatic to forensic psychology is the observation that
extremes of character and focus often predict antisocial and violent behavior (Egan, 2011;
2013; Egan, Austin, Elliot, Patel, & Charlesworth, 2003). Assessment of an individual’s
historical, clinical and relapse-associated factors are moderately effective predictors of future
risk in violent, sexual, and mentally-disordered offenders (Yang, Wong, & Coid, 2010). Yang
et al conclude that while most violence risk assessment tools employed to predict violence are
interchangeable, they are not equally accurate. Methods for assessing violence risk in
offenders and mentally disordered offenders are now well-established; less well-established
and more sceptically regarded is the notion that one can apply such principles to assess
violent extremists. Misgivings about the use of such methods in what is a highly nuanced
and political arena are not without foundation (Silke, 1998; 2001).
Problems with screening for vulnerability.
Paul Meehl observed that what one can predict statistically in a population is difficult
for an individual (Grove, 2005). Even with fair test-retest reliability and small standard
errors, confidence limits around the scores from instruments predicting risk of violence are
considerable for groups, and, some argue, can be so large for an individual that specific
clinical prediction is essentially meaningless (Hart, Michie, & Cooke, 2007). While the
limits of such instruments ostensibly preclude their being used in isolation for any decision-
making in the criminal justice system (Yang et al, 2010, pp. 740), in practice this is not the
case (Cooke & Michie, 2014). This is because such instruments may assist prioritisation of
cases for closer review (ideally using proper structured professional judgment instruments),
in the same way screening instruments are used in other domains of applied psychology.
Whilst a psychometric instrument may lack reliability, applied psychologists sometimes use
inexact indices with partial validity that allow probabilistic inferences to be made (Harris,
Rice, & Quinsey, 2007; Harris & Rice, 2007). Practitioners routinely work with uncertainty
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and inexact or missing data to make real-world decisions (Gray, Snowden, MacCulloch,
Phillips, Taylor, & MacCulloch, 2004; Gray, Taylor, & Snowden, 2008), for example the
FBI’s evaluation of death threats sent to high-profile targets (Borum, Fein, Vossekuil. &
Berglund, 1999).
Can risk assessment paradigms be applied to risk of violent extremism?
Applying the conventional risk assessment approach prospectively to violent
extremism is problematic. Firstly, screening for a given construct with a low base rate will
inevitably produce poor predictive values, as the intended outcome criterion may be rare;
inappropriate use of screening instruments with a healthy population to spot an increased risk
of a disease can generate harmful outcomes, as well as waste limited resources best directed
to those who need them (Grimes & Schulz, 2002). Some believe sociological and cultural
approaches better describe the forces leading to violent extremism (Schbley, 2003), in which
case methods deriving from clinical and individual psychology traditions may be
inappropriately applied to such concerns (Dernevik, Beck, Grann, Hogue, & McGuire, 2009).
Others suggest that the empirical claims of contemporary risk assessment methodology to
assist in this area are exaggerated. For example, the receiver-operated-characteristic (ROC)
methods commonly used to evaluate risk assessment instruments against specific outcomes
work better for high-probability, low-impact events (e.g., generic reconviction) than low-
probability, high-impact events (e.g., a mass killing, or a terrorist attack) (Sjöstedt & Grann,
2002). Meta-analysis of the predictive validity for tools commonly used to assess risk of
violence, sexual, and criminal behavior suggests the positive and negative predictive values
they generate are insufficient to justify being the sole factor in determining an individual’s
detention, sentencing, and release (Fazel, Singh, Doll, & Grann, 2012). Moreover, general
factors predicting violence (viz. gender, social class, education. mental illness, criminal
history, substance misuse, extremes of personality, and personality disorder) are not so clear
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in the case histories of persons identified as terrorists (Monahan, 2012; Silke, 1998). Given
these technical and epistemological concerns, critics claim the development of screening
instruments for risk of violent extremism (and the technology and systems of governance and
control they require or may set in motion) is unethical, potentially leading to illegal activity
and human rights abuse by the State (Monahan, 2011; Sims 2007).
To grossly reject proven methods as a possible approach to violent extremism is to
reject a large body of potentially useful knowledge and expertise (Gudjonsson, 2009). For
example, Roberts and Horgan (2008) suggest an instrument akin to the third revision of the
Historical Clinical Risk-20 (HCR-20 V3: Douglas, Hart, Webster, & Belfrage, 2013)) or the
screening version of Hare’s revised Psychology Checklist (Hart, Cox, & Hare, 1995) is
potentially applicable to guide assessments of violent extremists. Kennedy, Homant, and
Barnes (2008) used a checklist developed by US security to screen for members of possible
terrorist sleeper cells. Tested on a Muslim cohort, these criteria formed a single dimension
related to concern about terrorism. Psychometric and risk-assessment approaches have also
proven informative for understanding the structure of violent militant mindset (Saucier,
Akers, Shen-Miller, Kneževié, & Stankov, 2009; Stankov, Saucier, & Knezevic, 2010).
---- Insert table 1 here ---
The Identifying Vulnerable People (IVP) guidance.
The Identifying Vulnerable People (IVP) guidance (available from
www.tacticaldecisionmaking.org) was developed as part of a project to provide public sector
frontline practitioners (e.g., school teachers, health care workers, and Police Officers) with a
checklist of key behaviors that might assist the identification of individuals vulnerable to
recruitment into violent extremism, or contributing to such activity. For example, risk-taking
behavior can be inferred by an individual’s lifestyle, whereas travel and residence abroad
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could be inferred by a person’s movements through official border checks. The IVP guidance
criteria derive from a thematic analysis of open source material on British Muslims (Cole &
Cole, 2009) who had engaged in or been convicted of terrorist offences (Cole, Alison, Cole,
& Alison, 2009; Cole, Cole, Alison, & Alison 2010; Weyers & Cole 2014). IVP items range
from the very non-specific (e.g., familial conflict), through to very specific risk factors (e.g.,
engagement in overseas combat). The IVP’s non-specific criteria indirectly indicate the
importance of considering common behavioral problems (e.g., criminality, substance use)
commonly associated with violence (Dolan & Rennie, 2008). Criminality and substance use
is captured in the IVP by the item 3: “risk-taking behaviour”.
Intentions of study.
The current study (the first to use the IVP) examines whether the IVP items cohere as
a useful screening metric when used to evaluate known violent extremists for whom
publically available data was available, using open source intelligence sources (OSINT;
Stottlemeyer, 2015). This method tests the IVP in a criterion group of heterogeneous
individuals convicted of a variety of offences involving violent extremism deriving from a
variety of ideologies. This provides a strong test of the ideological neutrality of the IVP,
given it was developed primarily to address persons inspired by violent Islamism. To
examine if the IVP reflected generic factors, we also included a cohort of school shooters as
an ideologically-neutral but alienated criterion group. Lastly, the IVP was examined for
association with the real-world violent outcomes in the individual cases; committing or being
convicted of acts that led to the death, injury, or potential/actual bombing of civilians.
METHOD
Sample
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The cohort comprised an opportunistic sample of 182 named persons who had committed
offences involving violent extremism for whom case information was available in the public
domain via on-line searches using “Google”. The sample comprised 90 (49.2%) primarily
UK-based persons arrested for terrorist offences inspired by Islam. There were also 20
(10.9%) animal rights activists, 33 (18.0%) school shooters, 17 far-right activists (9.3%), 18
Irish Republican Army activists (9.8%), and 4 (2.2%) violent Sikh militants. The cohort was
almost completely male; 176 (96.2) out of 182 persons. Public domain information
specifically linking the persons to an offence was available for 157 of these persons, and
indicated that 47 of the persons had been in incidents that led to the death of 1 to 13 persons,
with another 56 involved in incidents leading to the injury of between 1 and 200 persons.
Eighty-seven persons had been convicted for involvement in bomb-making activities, while
41 could be described as isolated, self-styled violent extremists. Our classification was
based on OSINT. The name of the individuals rated and the violent extremist group they
were allegedly involved with is presented at appendix A.
Procedure.
We used an OSINT method (Burke, 2007) to code and classify the individuals in this study.
OSINT comprises publically-available content potentially available to anyone. Google
Search was used to identify official newspaper reports of the trials of the named offenders,
and to codify offence history, with supplementary data being obtained from further on-line
articles and, if available, Wikipedia entries on the individuals. While subject to all the
caveats Internet-held information provokes, Wikipedia is self-correcting (Anthony, Smith, &
Williamson, 2009). OSINT data is no more unreliable than any other intelligence, and has
the virtue of often being open to easier corroboration and checking by an independent
reviewer than information acquired by state agencies that may have to conceal sources
(Hulnick, 2010). Classification using IVP criteria was conducted conservatively, with
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persons being rated for each of the 16 criteria as 0 (no record/ not known), 1 (low evidence),
2 (medium evidence), and 3 (good evidence for the construct).
---- Insert table 2 here ----
To examine the integrity of OSINT IVP ratings, two additional raters blind-classified
16% (30) of the cases, these cases being the members of the cohort with the greatest amount
of information available for them. Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960) was calculated to
determine agreement (table 2). These results show IVP ratings ranging from 0.63 to 1.00,
and all were significant at P<.001. The mean kappa was 0.80; when the information was
available, using OSINT to code IVP constructs is generally very reliable.
Plan of analysis
To examine whether the IVP items cohered as a useable metric, the reliability and
validity of the measure was examined within and between extremist groups. All missing data
were scored as 0 (construct not present) to reduce chance effects and enable the data to be
approached using multivariate methods. This approach could be seen as being the equivalent
of being presumed innocent until there is positive evidence for guilt (though may exaggerate
effects for persons better documented within the public domain). As no criterion group had
more than 100 persons, differences in alpha reliability between groups were compared using
the Fisher-Bonnett test (Kim & Feldt, 2008; www.bgu.ac.il/~baranany/Feldt.xls). We tested
whether IVP items were more effective if weighted using reliability and ANOVA measures,
also testing whether IVP scores differed across extremist types. We used ROC and AUC to
test if IVP screening scores predicted one of three violent outcomes: killing, injuring, or
bombing. Lastly, we used diagnostic test statistics (sensitivity, specificity, positive and
negative predictive values) to evaluate IVP performance.
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RESULTS
---- Insert table 8 here ----
Functioning of the IVP across groups
Initial analysis found persons typically had about seven items of the IVP missing from
OSINT (table 3); this was differentially distributed through the extremist groups: F (4, 173) =
24.89, P<.001, school shooters and animal rights activists had significantly more information
missing to all other groups using post-hoc Scheffe test at P < .01 or below. Tests of
reliability (table 4) across extremist groups indicated differential functioning of the IVP in
terms of internal reliability. The IVP was more reliable screening Irish Republicans and
Islamists, but particularly unreliable for screening of animal rights activists and school
shooters. The difference of reliability between lowest and highest alpha reliability (animal
rights activists versus Irish republicans) using the Fisher-Bonnett test was z = -2.81, P =
0.003; the difference of IRA and Islamist reliabilities was z= -1.92, P = 0.027. A regression
predicting IVP total from extremist group membership, missing items, and the interaction of
these was highly significant; R=0.89, adjusted R2 = 0.78, F(3, 174) = 209.31, P<.001.
Neither group, or the group x missing items interaction significantly independently
contributed to this outcome, although missing data had a strong influence on total IVP (t = -
9.94, P<.001). Some IVP items were more salient for some groups than others; for example,
the animal rights activists did not present as isolated, did not show changes in religious
practice, had not travelled or lived overseas, and had no experience of overseas combat. In
other cases, the items lacked variance; all school shooters were alienated from their peers
(IVP item 7); and all Irish Republicans were integrated with their families (IVP 2) while
being members of an extremist group (IVP 13). The reliability of the IVP for Irish
Republicans, Islamists and right-wing extremists together was the same as to the alpha
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reliability of the IVP for the full sample: 0.64. Results indicated removal of items would not
increase the reliability of the scale. Weighting items hypothesised as more salient by 2 to 4
times did not improve reliability or validity, justifying the use of a single total IVP total score
in subsequent analyses.
---- Insert table 5 here ----
Comparison of IVP across extremist groups.
Summary scores (mean and standard deviation) were calculated for the total IVP measure,
and broken down by extremist group, excluding the extremist Sikhs (of whom there were
only 4 participants) and a single radical libertarian (table 5). The difference across groups
was highly significant: F(4, 173) = 15.48, P<.001, partial eta squared = 0.264, Power = 1.00.
Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons found that animal rights activists and school shooters had
significantly lower IVP scores than Irish republican, Islamist, and right-wing extremists, who
did not differ significantly between themselves.
---- Insert table 6 and 7 here ----
ROCs predicting violent offences from IVP total score.
To test whether the IVP related to specific harmful behaviors, ROC curves were
calculated between scores for total IVP and three categorical criminal outcomes; the person
being involved in an offence that led to a conviction for injury, a killing, or a bombing. The
higher the area under the curve (AUC) produced by an ROC analysis, the more sensitive the
measure is able to identify the particular outcome. An AUC over 0.7 is regarded as fair,
while 0.8 is good. The ability of the IVP to predict injury, killing, or involvement in a
bombing was greater for more established politicised violent extremist groups than for animal
rights activists or school shooters. A similar ROC analysis was conducted on whether the
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violent extremist was apparently working alone (a lone actor) as compared to in a group. The
AUC for a total IVP score predicting membership of the lone actor category was low and
non-significant: 0.40 (95% confidence interval = .31 to .50).
Finally, to explore the value of the IVP for evaluating risk of genuine harm in a
criterion group of persons who had been committed violent acts that involved a bombing
campaign, persons being injured, or persons being killed, a sensitivity/ specificity analysis
was conducted (table 7). Total IVP scores were examined in relation to the outcomes used in
the AUC analysis using the sensitivity/ specificity analyses provided by the online medical
calculator, MedCalc (http://www.medcalc.org/calc/diagnostic_test.php). These results show
that specificity and sensitivity of the IVP was modest, as was the positive predictive value;
however, the measure appeared to have a fair negative predictive value in accurately
identifying persons who would not be involved in injurious or homicidal events.
DISCUSSION
The IVP guidance was developed for UK Government as an ideologically neutral tool
to provide frontline practitioners from a wide range of UK public agencies (i.e. primary
schools through to prisons) with a checklist of behaviors that potentially indicated
vulnerability to violent extremism in their service users. The current study is the first to
explore the properties of the checklist, and used a convenience sample comprising persons
who could be unambiguously seen as the kinds of individuals the instrument was intended to
identify (i.e., “true positives”). Persons were rated on the IVP using OSINT. Data were
sought from publically- available information on the Internet and contemporaneous
newspaper reports of the trials describing the persons in the database. Information to score
items was often missing, and this influenced total scores on the IVP. The reliability of the
measure was greater for cohorts with more information, and less effective for those with
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more missing information. Data were approached conservatively, and we were mindful of
the many difficulties with the kind of information we used to rate persons. Generally, as the
amount of OSINT increased, so did the number of criteria the individual scored against. The
information used here was based on that available in the public domain, and may not reflect
official knowledge of the individuals involved.
Implications
Taking these caveats into account, our exploratory findings indicate that using the
total unweighted IVP score is the optimal way of using the IVP, and that it is best applied to
screening for conventional violent extremists. The IVP checklist total was not systematically
sensitive or specific for identifying persons convicted for injuring, killing, or being involved
in a bombing campaign, though showed sporadic associations with these outcomes in
subgroup analyses. The confidence limits on the AUCs were such that with better data, a
more conclusive result could be made of the measure’s validity. The IVP guidance was
developed to identify all types of violent extremists (including recruiters and facilitators), so
our specific (and more violent) outcomes perhaps focus on severe outcomes relative to
process and “joint enterprise” type offences committed by persons included in the cohort.
Our results underline the importance of using systematic data using official
information to assess risk, and that use of the IVP (or any other screening device) should be
under strong professional review. For example, individual items need to be scored carefully;
for example, the link between low level criminality and apparent terrorism is sometimes more
pragmatic than sincere. In lawless and unstable states, criminals sometimes adopt the
signifiers and rhetoric of broader conflict to justify offences; for example, dacoit kidnapping
and extortion in India and Pakistan (Sahito, Farooq, & Chandio, 2009), or piracy in the Horn
of Africa (Ohnuoha, 2009), both of which existed long before they became rationalised by
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reference to Islamic struggles. “Travelling abroad” and “religious practice” are also
somewhat non-specific and over-general; many persons travel internationally to visit family,
and observing a socially conservative faith is common for many believers, so not inherently
an indicator of risk or behavioral pathology; “radical” (or reactionary) does not mean
“terrorist” (Bartlett & Miller, 2012). A recognised risk for radicals “inspired” by Islam is lack
of objective religious knowledge, or an aggressively conservative interpretation of the faith,
rather than a sudden change in religious behavior per se (Loza, El-Fatah, Prinsloo, Hesselink-
Louw,& Seidler, 2011). Ignorance or polarised views can be easily exploited by recruiters
and ideologues (Cole, Alison, Cole, & Alison, 2009).
Limitations
The effects here might be thought modest, and to preclude further development of the
IVP. That is unduly pessimistic, and reflects the heterogeneity of participants, and the
informational limitations described. Despite their modest predictive values, soft behavioral
signs are commonly considered in a variety of disciplines. For example, while “oddness” and
“social withdrawal” are seen as cardinal prodromal antecedents to psychosis, positive
predictive values for developing frank psychosis are below our equivalent values for
prediction of violent outcome (Johnstone, Ebmeier, Miller, Owens, & Lawrie, 2005).
Likewise, our data generated predictive values comparable to those found when screening for
lower level mental disorders in primary health care using a standard clinical instrument.
Such predictive values in a healthcare setting invited the authors to propose that the SCL-90
provides a rough index of concern, which they recommended be followed-up with more
specific clinical assessment (Schmitz, Kruse, Heckrath, Alberti, & Tress, 1999).
Monahan (2012) calls for the development of structured individualised risk
assessment instruments involving professional judgement specific to terrorism and violent
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extremism, focussing on the ideological, affiliative and grievance/ self-righteously based
factors in the histories of such individuals. He acknowledges that risk assessment
instruments addressing terrorism and violent extremism are not easily validated in
prospective studies of the ‘capture-recapture’ kind used in general violence risk assessment
research, but may nevertheless differentiate persons at differential risk within a population of
interest. We also note that it is axiomatic to epidemiology that the prevalence of a construct
in a sample affects the results of a screening test; in a low-prevalence setting, even a very
strong psychometric instrument has poor predictive values (Grimes & Schulz, 2002).
Intelligent use of screening information.
It is wrong to conflate screening and risk assessment; the IVP is intended as a
screening device, with risk assessment of individuals occurring at a higher level in the
PREVENT process. The use of screening tests generates ‘false positives’ and ‘false
negatives’. False positives and negatives arise from brief measures, and using unreliable
outcomes uncritically underlines the importance of any screening being supplemented by
specific intelligence (akin to clinical information) regarding the person of interest (Miller &
Brodsky, 2011). This approach is inherent within the third- and fourth-generation violence
risk assessments used by clinical practitioners and public protection panels that have to
interpret the probabilistic risk information they generate. Classically, once information from
a checklist or risk screening instrument is subjected to what is known more specifically about
the person in question, risk is mostly moderated downwards (Douglas & Kropp, 2002).
Revising provisional decisions reflects an awareness of the dynamic and risk-reducing factors
that increase or decrease an individual’s risk-state (Douglas & Skeem, 2005), and are crucial
given the potential expense, resources, and potential violations of human rights caused by
over-reacting to false positives with a criminal justice response.
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The potential threat posed by false negatives indicates that focusing on the false
positive rate is only one side of the debate. The key point for IVP guidance is that all of the
dataset in this study was scored using IVP guidance and would have thus potentially
identified concerns prior to the commission of their offence by at least one statutory agency
screening with the instrument. In theory, effective prevention interventions could have been
employed to obstruct the development of extremist behaviour in these individuals. Therefore
the correct way to interpret the utility of screening tools, such as the IVP guidance, is to
balance the problems of both false positives and negatives, rather than just focus on the
potential for false positives. In over 5 years of widespread use there has been no indications
of the problems often associated with false positives, and, to the best of our knowledge, only
one false negative (Weyers & Cole, 2014). In the latter case, an individual meeting only one
IVP criteria was not passed onto a law enforcement agency when identified as part of a
research study into online radicalisation, and several months later killed one person and
injured another. On the other hand, multiple people and internet sites have been reported to
law enforcement agencies resulting in the disruption of terrorist networks, seizure of illegal
weapons, convictions for terrorist-related activities, and removal of terrorist-related online
content (Weyers & Cole, 2014).
Future directions and conclusions
---- Insert table 8 here ----
The IVP guidance is currently the only ideologically neutral screening tool for violent
extremism available in the public domain and open to scientific study. It is being used in
multiple countries by a range of statutory agencies for screening and there is no indication to
date that there is any evidence of widespread misuse or inappropriate reaction to
identification. Violent activity from a range of violent extremist groups (i.e. not just
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Islamists) has been brought to the attention of law enforcement agencies through the use of
the IVP guidance resulting in criminal justice interventions (i.e. true positives). The death and
injuries associated with the one known false negative to date underscore the price to be paid
for a failure to effectively screen individuals who are beginning to engage with violent
extremist activity. Analysis of de novo datasets are currently underway (Weyers & Cole,
2014). One of the problems of using post hoc OSINT to test the properties of a screening
tool, such as the IVP guidance, is that the analyses are dependent on, and restricted by, the
amount of information available. Until agencies with access to more information are willing
to either provide access to that information or conduct the screening themselves, it will
difficult to know whether the IVP guidance - or any other screening tool for violent
extremism - is valid and reliable.
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Table 1: IVP Checklist items.
1. Cultural and religious isolation
2. Isolation from family
3. Risk taking behavior
4. Sudden change in religious practice
5. Violent rhetoric
6. Negative peer influences
7. Isolated from peer group
8. Hate rhetoric
9. Political activism
10. Basic paramilitary training
11. Travel/ residence abroad
12. Death rhetoric – increased salience
13. Extremist group membership – increased salience
14. Contact with known recruiters and extremists – increased salience
15. Advanced paramilitary training – increased salience
16. Overseas combat – increased salience
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Table 2: Blind kappa agreement between raters for the 16 items of the IVP.
Kappa 95% confidence interval
Cultural and religious isolation .72 .94, .49
Isolation from family .84 1, .63
Risk taking behavior .63 .87, .39
Sudden change in religious practice .87 1, .69
violent rhetoric .69 .90, .49
Negative peer influences .79 .98, .61
Isolated from peer group .83 1, .66
Hate rhetoric .80 1, .60
Political activism .77 .98, .56
Basic paramilitary training .85 1, .70
Travel/ residence abroad .88 1, .76
Death rhetoric .68 .94, .42
Extremist group membership .89 1, .77
Contact with known recruiters and extremists .88 1, .76
Advanced paramilitary training .64 .79, .49
Overseas combat 1.00 0 to 0
Table legend: all kappa coefficients significant (P<.001)
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Table 3: percentage missing data for IVP items in sample.
Missing (%)
Cultural and religious isolation 7.1
Isolation from family 21.0
Risk taking behavior 13.7
Sudden change in religious practice 29.0
violent rhetoric 65.0
Negative peer influences 65.6
Isolated from peer group 94.0
Hate rhetoric 39.3
Political activism 56.3
Basic paramilitary training 69.9
Travel/ residence abroad 33.9
Death rhetoric 47.0
Extremist group membership 37.2
Contact with known recruiters and extremists 66.7
Advanced paramilitary training 65.0
Overseas combat 68.3
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Table 4: Alpha reliability of the total unweighted IVP score across extremist groups.
n n items Alpha reliability
Animal rights 20 12 0.32
School shooters 33 15 0.38
Islamists 90 16 0.65
Irish Republicans 18 14 0.84
Right wing extremists 17 16 0.61
All 182 16 0.64
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Table 5: One way ANOVA comparing violent extremists on IVP total.
Animal
rights
School
shooters
Islamists Irish
Republicans
Right-wing
extremists
F-ratio
(4, 173)
P<
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
IVP
Total
score
11.8 2.88 14.94 5.30 21.40 7.39 23.17 9.46 24.7 6.44 15.48 .001
Table legend: SD = standard deviation.
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Table 6: ROC analyses (AUC) of IVP total/ violent outcomes for extremist groups.
Cause injury Kill Bombing
Animal rights activists 0.53 - 0.54
95% CI .24, .78 - .23, .85
School shooters 0.67 0.64 0.49
95% CI .43, .91 .47, .81 .31, .67
Islamists 0.63 0.66 0.59
95% CI .47, .79 .50, .82 .43, .75
Irish Republicans 0.43 0.86 * 0.37
95% CI .13, .72 .67, 1.00 .11, .63
Right wing extremists 0.89 ** 1.00 * 0.28
95% CI .71, 1.00 1.00, 1.00 .03, .52
Islamists, Irish republicans right-wing extremists alone 0.60 0.73 ** 0.48
95% CI .47, .73 .61, .85 .35, .61
All groups 0.51 0.49 0.63 **
95% CI .42, .61 .39, .58 .55, .72
Table legend; AUC = area under curve.; 95% CI = 95% confidence interval. ROC/IVP for
animal rights activists not calculated as no persons killed by this group. Significance * =
P<.05; ** = P<.01.
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Table 7: Sensitivity and specificity of the total unweighted IVP score in relation to violent
outcomes.
Sensitivity
(%)
Specificity
(%)
Positive predictive
value (%)
Negative predictive
value (%)
Injury 58.3 55.9 30.0 80.5
95% CI 40.8, 74.5 46.1, 65.3 19.6, 42.1 69.9, 88.7
Kill 66.7 57.9 31.4 85.7
95% CI 48.2, 82.0 48.3, 67.1 20.9, 43.6 75.8, 92.7
Bombing 60.0 63.6 60.0 63.6
95% CI 47.6, 71.5 51.9, 74.3 47.6, 71.5 51.9, 74.3
Table legend. 95% CI = 95% confidence interval; Sensitivity: the probability that a test
result will be positive when the construct is present (true positive rate); Specificity: the
probability that a test result will be negative when the construct is not present (true
negative rate); Positive predictive value: the probability that the construct is present when
the test is positive; Negative predictive value: the probability that the construct is not
present when the test is negative.
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Table 8: learning points from this study.
 Open-source intelligence may lack detail available to official agencies, reducing
the amount of risk-related information in quick screening instruments.
 Different violent extremist cohorts have present different profiles of risk reflecting
their prior history and the trajectory that brought them to the current position.
 Weighting item information deemed to be more salient (or not) did not improve
reliability or validity of measurement using the IVP.
 Screening instruments must be followed by a human-driven risk assessment of the
individual to optimise judgement of the risk and risk state.
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Appendix A: Persons included in the analysis and their associated preferred
ideology.
Name Extremist movement
1. Greg Avery Animal rights
2. Natasha Avery Animal rights
3. Heather Nicholson Animal rights
4. Gavin Medd-Hall Animal rights
5. Gerrah Selby Animal rights
6. Daniel Wadham Animal rights
7. Daniel Amos Animal rights
8. Deborah Morrison Animal rights
9. Diane Jamieson Animal rights
10. Donald Currie Animal rights
11. Robert Cogswell Animal rights
12. Jon Curtin Animal rights
13. Barry Horne Animal rights
14. Charlotte Lewis Animal rights
15. Joseph Harris Animal rights
16. Jon Ablewhite Animal rights
17. Josephine Mayo Animal rights
18. John Smith Animal rights
19. Kerry Whitburn Animal rights
20. Laurence McKeown Irish Republican Army
21. Sean O'Callaghan Irish Republican Army
22. Eamon Collins Irish Republican Army
23. Kieran Doherty Irish Republican Army
24. Martin Meehan Irish Republican Army
25. Joe Cahill Irish Republican Army
26. Bobby Sands Irish Republican Army
27. Phil O'Donnell Irish Republican Army
28. Patrick Magee Irish Republican Army
29. Martin McGuinness Irish Republican Army
30. Gerry Adams Irish Republican Army
31. Dominic McGlinchey Irish Republican Army
32. Gerry Kelly Irish Republican Army
33. Noel Maguire Irish Republican Army
34. Robert Hulme Irish Republican Army
35. Aiden Hulme Irish Republican Army
36. James McCormack Irish Republican Army
37. John Hannan Irish Republican Army
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38. Mohammed Kamel Islamist (home)
39. Mohsin Ghalain Islamist (home)
40. Samad Ahmed Islamist (home)
41. Shahid Butt Islamist (home)
42. Malik Harhara Islamist (home)
43. Iyad Hussein Islamist (home)
44. Shazad Nabi Islamist (home)
45. Ghulam Hussein Islamist (home)
46. Richard Reid Islamist (home)
47. Sajid Badat Islamist (home)
48. Moinul Abedin Islamist (home)
49. Omar Sheik Islamist (home)
50. Asif Hanif Islamist (home)
51. Omar Sharif Islamist (home)
52. Mohammed Khan Islamist (home)
53. Shezaad Tanweer Islamist (home)
54. Germaine Lindsay Islamist (home)
55. Hasib Hussain Islamist (home)
56. Muktar Ibrahim Islamist (home)
57. Ramzi Mohammed Islamist (home)
58. Yassin Omar Islamist (home)
59. Hussein Osman Islamist (home)
60. Manfo Asiedu Islamist (home)
61. Aadel Yahya Islamist (home)
62. Abu Mansha Islamist (home)
63. Omar Khyam Islamist (home)
64. Salahuddin Amin Islamist (home)
65. Jawad Akbar Islamist (home)
66. Waheed Mahmood Islamist (home)
67. Anthony Garcia Islamist (home)
68. Dhiren Barot Islamist (home)
69. Qaisar Shaffi Islamist (home)
70. Mohammed Bhatti Islamist (home)
71. Junade Feroze Islamist (home)
72. Zia ul-Haq Islamist (home)
73. Abdul Aziz Jalil Islamist (home)
74. Hamid Elasmar Islamist (home)
75. Attilla Ahmet Islamist (home)
76. Mohammed al-Figari Islamist (home)
77. Kibley Da Costa Islamist (home)
78. Kidar Ahmed Islamist (home)
79. Mohammed Kyriacou Islamist (home)
80. Yassin Mutegombwa Islamist (home)
81. Hassan Mutegombwa Islamist (home)
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82. Abdullah Ahmed Ali Islamist (home)
83. Kazi Nurur Rahman Islamist (home)
84. Andrew Rowe Islamist (home)
85. Arafat Waheed Khan Islamist (home)
86. Waheed Zaman Islamist (home)
87. Ibrahim Savant Islamist (home)
88. Umar Islam Islamist (home)
89. Tanvir Hussain Islamist (home)
90. Assad Sarwar Islamist (home)
91. Sohal Queshi Islamist (home)
92. Younis Tsouli Islamist (home)
93. Tariq Al-Daour Islamist (home)
94. Ali al-Tamimi Islamist (home)
95. Kamal Bourgass Islamist (home)
96. Hassan Tabbakh Islamist (home)
97. Faisal Mostafa Islamist (home)
98. Kamel Merzoug Islamist (home)
99. Parviz Khan Islamist (home)
100. Mohammed Irfan Islamist (home)
101. Bassiru Gassama Islamist (home)
102. Zahoor Iqbal Islamist (home)
103. Nicky Reilly Islamist (home)
104. Bilal Abdullah Islamist (home)
105. Kafeel Ahmed Islamist (home)
106. Michael Adebolajo Islamist (home)
107. Michael Adebowale Islamist (home)
108. Abu Hamza Islamist (home)
109. Andrew Ibrahim Islamist (home)
110. Aabid Khan Islamist (home)
111. Krenar Lusha Islamist (home)
112. Matthew Newton Islamist (home)
113. Munir Farooqi Islamist (home)
114. Israr Malik Islamist (home)
115. Mohammed Hamid Islamist (home)
116. Irfan Naseer Islamist (home)
117. Irfan Khalid Islamist (home)
118. Ashik Ali Islamist (home)
119. Rahin Ahmed Islamist (home)
120. Bahader Ali Islamist (home)
121. Mohammed Rizwan Islamist (home)
122. Mujahid Hussain Islamist (home)
123. Shaaq Hussain Islamist (home)
124. Khobalb Hussain Islamist (home)
125. Shahid Khan Islamist (home)
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126. Naweed Ali Islamist (home)
127. Abdullah el-Faisal Islamist (home)
128. Miles Cooper libertarian paranoid
129. David Copeland Right-wing extremist
130. Martyn Gilleard Right-wing extremist
131. Neil Lewington Right-wing extremist
132. Robert Cottage Right-wing extremist
133. David Jackson Right-wing extremist
134. Alan Boyce Right-wing extremist
135. Terry Collins Right-wing extremist
136. William Thompson Right-wing extremist
137. Nathan Worrell Right-wing extremist
138. John Laidlaw Right-wing extremist
139. David Tovey Right-wing extremist
140. Darren Wells Right-wing extremist
141. Will (a.k.a. Bill) Browning Right-wing extremist
142. Charlie Sargent Right-wing extremist
143. Tony Lecomber Right-wing extremist
144. Mark Atkinson Right-wing extremist
145. Del O'Connor Right-wing extremist
146. Eric Harris School shooter
147. Dylan Klebold School shooter
148. Pekka-Eric Auvinen School shooter
149. Tim Kretchmer School shooter
150. Cho seung hui School shooter
151. Jeffrey Weise School shooter
152. Matti Juhani Saari School shooter
153. Kimveer Gill School shooter
154. Thomas Hamilton School shooter
155. Robert Stenhauser School shooter
156. Steven Kazmierczak School shooter
157. Kipland Kinkel School shooter
158. Asa Coon School shooter
159. Charles Carl Roberts School shooter
160. Latina Williams School shooter
161. Drew Golden School shooter
162. Mitchell Johnson School shooter
163. Michael Carneal School shooter
164. Luke Woodham School shooter
165. Sebastian Bosse School shooter
166. Alvaro Castillo School shooter
167. Adam Lanza School shooter
168. Charles Andrew Williams School shooter
169. Farda Gadirov School shooter
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170. Wellington Oliveira School shooter
171. Tyrone Mitchell School shooter
172. Marc Lepine School shooter
173. Mamoru Takuma School shooter
174. Alaa Abu Dhein School shooter
175. One Goh School shooter
176. Mohammed Nazari School shooter
177. Patrick Purdy School shooter
178. Kim De Gelder School shooter
179. Inderjit Singh Reyat Sikh extremist
180. Karamajit Singh Chahal Sikh extremist
181. Sukhwinder Singh Gill Sikh extremist
182. Jarnail Singh Sikh extremist
